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Unlocking the gates to the peasants: Will policies of ‘fairness’ or 
‘inclusion’ do more for equity in higher education? 
Attempts to make higher education more equitable more readily succeed at the 
aggregate (sector) level than at the institutional, with students from 
disadvantaged groups being overrepresented in low-status institutions. It is 
suggested that this is because policies of ‘fairness’ (i.e. proportional 
representation) dominate the contemporary policy framework and are strongly 
resisted by elite universities. However, using the Australian higher education 
sector as an example, this paper argues that equity policy is actually a mix of 
‘proportional fairness’ and ‘inclusion’ and elite institutions resist not because the 
policy is deficient but because it might actually work. An alternative approach to 
higher education equity policy is proposed; one which requires elite institutions 
to engage meaningfully with disadvantaged students but allows them to retain 
their status advantage. 
Keywords: Equity in higher education; higher education policy; elite universities; 
widening participation 
Introduction 
The idea of social equity has been a recurrent theme in public policies relating to 
Australian higher education for almost four decades (Rizvi & Lingard, 2011), yet 
appears to be marked more by failure than success (Corrigan & Ng-A-Fook, 2012; Gale, 
2009). Public universities are typified as being either powerless to remove or complicit 
in maintaining barriers to wider participation. Powerlessness is usually explained as the 
result of external policy failure; whether poorly constructed (Sehoole, 2005) or non-
existent (Watson, 2004). When viewed as being complicit in the process, the image of 
universities as ‘ivory towers’ is frequently invoked (Karabel, 2005; Watson & Watson, 
2013). Most often however, educational disadvantage is theorised as a function of both, 
where universities are both subject to and perpetuate social privilege (Bourdieu, 1996). 
Despite the growing power – and desire - of the state to re-form higher education as a 
lucrative service to be sold in the global marketplace, certain universities still possess 
sufficient financial and cultural resources to re-legitimise academic cultural capital, and 
so protect their position of dominance in the field (Naidoo, 2004). Even as mass higher 
education increases its overall reach, it is the lower-status universities that 
disproportionately provide access for students from disadvantaged backgrounds 
(Naidoo, 2004; Pitman & Vidovich, 2012). 
With this in mind and drawing upon Amartya Sen (2009), Simon Marginson 
(2011a) suggests that there are two possibilities for equity in higher education. The first 
he labels ‘fairness’ and requires policy to enable proportional social representation in 
higher education. Here, policy and practice seek to lift the participation rates of under-
represented groups towards levels broadly equivalent to their wider social share. Ideally 
this applies to all universities, elite or otherwise. This is the approach most often 
favoured by the state, whether it recognises distinctions of status within the sector or 
not. For example, when the Government of France in 2010 pressured its country’s 
grandes écoles to set a goal of increasing the percentage of scholarship students to 30 
percent, awareness of status drove its actions. However in Australia and the UK, current 
policies of widening participation make no such distinction and treat the sector as a 
homogenous entity. Marginson views policies of fairness, whether status is explicated 
or not, as less desirable for two reasons.  First, the long and short lenses of history both 
suggest that attempts towards fairness inevitably fail. Second, by linking it to Sen’s 
notion of ‘freedom as control’ Marginson implies that the normative construction of 
higher education as a model of social composition is overly oppressive. Whilst some 
degree of freedom as control is necessary in order to redress inequity, he argues, it is 
better to focus on ‘agency freedom, and especially freedom as power, through learning, 
knowledge and credentialing’ (Marginson, 2011a, p. 30).  
This leads to the second possibility for equity in higher education, which 
Marginson believes is preferable. A focus on equity as ‘inclusion’, he contends, allows 
institutions to avoid a one-size-fits-all approach to policy and empower persons 
formerly excluded to become ‘their own best advocates and drivers of participation’ 
(Marginson, 2011a, p. 30). By allowing institutions to work around (rather than 
confront) issues of status in higher education, educational inequalities are more 
fruitfully mapped ‘in detail, rather than in aggregate’ (Marginson, 2011a, p. 34). In a 
sense, Marginson argues that it would be better for universities to inculcate values of 
justice within and outside the Academy, than be prescriptively just themselves. More 
‘build them and they will come’, than ‘build it’.  
Marginson’s theorisation of equity, status and freedom in higher education was 
informed by and published during the midst of the implementation of one of Australia’s 
most significant attempts to improve equity in higher education. In 2009, the Federal 
Government adopted a target that by 2020, 20 per cent of all higher-education students 
in higher education would be from the bottom population quartile in terms of socio-
economic status (Bradley, Noonan, Nugent, & Scales, 2008). In Marginson’s 
terminology, this was an attempt to achieve equity through fairness and therefore likely 
to fail, with the system destined to ‘spring back to type, reverting to the earlier 
distribution’ (Marginson, 2011a, p. 30).  At the time his article was published, 
Australian universities were in a lead-in period spanning 2009-2011, during which 
student selection practices were in flux.  Australia’s higher education system has now 
fully adopted the new demand-driven arrangement and it is therefore timely to revisit 
the distinction between fairness and inclusion in higher education. It is important that 
empirical data be used in the search for an objective foundation to reason Habermas, 
1971; Parkin, 1996). Accordingly, this study critically examined the data to search for 
the consequences of the attempt to make Australia’s higher education sector more 
equitable; whether discourses of  ‘fairness’ and/or ‘inclusion’ are evident and more 
specifically the impact on and response by the country’s elite universities, to equity 
policy.  
The significance of the findings is more universal. Equity is perhaps the most 
persistent policy issue in higher education (Martin, 2009) and the historical trend 
throughout most developed nations demonstrates that, whilst participation from 
disadvantaged groups of students has grown in absolute terms, their relative share has 
not similarly increased (Hinton-Smith, 2012) and this inequality is even greater in elite 
universities (Schuetze & Slowey, 2002). 
Status in higher education 
In higher education, status is the ‘elephant in the room’. Everyone knows it exists but 
rarely talks openly about it or references it in equity policy (Marginson, 2011a). The 
reality is that the field of higher education represents a system of knowledge where the 
symbolic value of an academic qualification is not only in evidence hierarchically (for 
example a PhD has greater  academic capital than a Bachelor’s degree) but also 
situationally; that is, relating to the place where the academic capital was acquired  
(Pitman & Vidovich, 2012) . Incoming students bring their own academic capital, with 
some students and their forms of capital being more highly prized than others (Pitman 
& Vidovich, 2013). The ‘game’, as Bourdieu (2002) called it, for both student and 
institution, is to gain positional advantage into and within the field of higher education 
by mobilising this capital. Generally, higher-status individuals and universities develop 
their ability to play the game at rates superior than others (Bathmaker, Ingram, & 
Waller, 2013). This is not a game of chance since the dice are loaded; specifically with 
cultural capital. 
Australia’s higher education system was formally unified in the late 1980s and is 
funded and legislated under the affectation that all universities are equal (Macintyre, 
2013). In reality, the existence of at least four strategic groupings within the field of 
higher education is testament to the sector’s fragmentation for reasons of strategy, status 
and position-taking. The Group of Eight (Go8) universities are the Australian version of 
the Russell Group in the UK or the Ivy League in the US. Whether measured by income 
inequalities (Halffman & Leydesdorff, 2010) or historical positional power (Moodie, 
2008), it is apparent these universities represent the elite sub-system at the core of all 
expanding higher education systems, which remain most resistant to policies of 
widening participation (Marginson, 2011a). These universities have and accept the 
highest level of academic capital, as evidenced by their rankings in international league 
tables such as the Academic Rankings of World Universities (ARWU).  
The Australian Technology Network (ATN) is an alliance of five Australian 
universities characterised by large undergraduate student populations and a focus on 
research in newly emerging discipline areas, though its academic staff commit more 
time to teaching than those in the Go8 universities (Bentley, Goedegebuure, & Meek, 
2014). The ATN claims to champion ‘principles of access and equity’ (ATN, 2009), yet 
access rates for disadvantaged students are worse for this group than any other 
excepting the Go8. Two of the ATN universities appear in the ARWU top 500 list. The 
seven Innovative Research Universities (IRU) operate mostly in outer metropolitan and 
provincial cities. The IRU claims to conduct research of international standing and 
indeed five of its seven members appear in the ARWU top 500. However its national 
research output places it below both the G08 and the ATN (Department of Education, 
2012a). It also records higher-than-average enrolments of students from low socio-
economic backgrounds (Department of Education, 2012b). The six members of the 
Regional Universities Network (RUN) are located in regional Australia, meaning they 
are located outside the major cities, which comprise more than two-thirds of the 
nation’s population. All have significantly higher levels of participation from students 
from groups under-represented in the rest of the sector and its research output is 
minimal, being less than four per cent of the sector’s total output. None of its 
universities are ranked internationally. 
The abovementioned rankings are not offered as a quantitative assessment of the 
quality of the institution but of the possible status that might be attached to each group, 
based on their cultural capital. The Go8 undeniably represent the elite part of 
Australia’s higher education sector whilst the RUN possesses the least cultural capital. 
The ATN and IRU each draw upon specific and somewhat different categories of 
capital in order to contest the mid ground. Of course, rankings do not measure higher 
education quality per se but its proxies. These proxies include prestige, wealth and 
power and their use omits and distorts as much as they illuminate our understanding of 
status in higher education (Trow, 1995). Status is not only earned, but endowed and 
assumed. 
Fairness and inclusion in contemporary Australian higher education equity 
policy  
After eleven years in opposition, the Australian Labor Party was re-elected at the 
national level in 2007. It soon reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to increasing 
higher education participation overall, with a particular focus on groups of students 
traditionally under-represented in universities. Two key recommendations adopted from 
its 2008 Review of the sector were a) 40 per cent of all 25 to 34 year olds be qualified at 
bachelor’s level or above by 2025 and b) that by 2020, 20 per cent of undergraduate 
domestic students enrolled but of low socio-economic status (SES) (Bradley et al., 
2008) . These two initiatives were the core of what became known as the ‘demand 
driven system’, whereby the Government agreed to extend its financial support to all 
domestic undergraduate students, compared to its previous policy of restricting supply. 
The move from a supply-side to a demand-side funding model had an immediate impact 
on institutional behaviour. From 2009 to 2012, the rate of growth for undergraduate 
domestic student enrolments increased by a third, compared to the three-year period 
prior to the implementation of the policy (Department of Education, 2012b). Growth in 
low-SES enrolments was 22 per cent, leading to a rise in this group’s relative share of 
all enrolments (National Centre for Student Equity in Higher Education, 2013). In other 
words, students from the main target group increased their participation in Australia’s 
universities in both absolute and proportional terms. 
Marginson defines this as a ‘fairness’ approach to higher education equity, as its 
foundational purpose is to alter the social composition of the student population, making 
it more representative of, if not an ideal, then at least a real social system. Marginson 
also argues that the Australian Government blurred the equity issue by pretending status 
did not exist: 
All government formulae are applied on a uniform basis. Status is the ‘elephant in 
the room’. No one can talk about it – even though everyone knows is there, and 
that it matters. By becoming status blind, the government can re-represent 
participation in all institutions as equivalent – regardless of the real social power of 
participation in different kinds of institution – using aggregate targets such as 20% 
of all enrolments. It sidesteps the question of the status (or quality) of particular 
student places (Marginson, 2011a, p. 32). 
In fact, underpinning the system-wide goal of 20 percent were individual university 
compacts designed to set institution-specific targets. The formula used took into account 
the university’s historical performance and socio-economic environs. Interim (2012) 
targets ranged from 5.61 per cent to 22.42 per cent per institution. This approach was 
designed to result in proportionate increases across the sector, meaning that the elite 
universities would be rewarded for improving participation at the same rate as other 
universities, even though their lower base-level meant that a 20 per cent figure would 
never be realised in their organisations. This was a ‘stable-shares’ approach to 
participation whereby the 20 per cent target would be achieved through a uniform 
increase in the low-SES enrolment shares of each university. Had the Government 
adopted a strictly fairness approach in meeting the 20 per cent target, certain (notably 
Go8) universities would have had to increase their historical enrolments of low SES 
students by up to 40 per cent (Phillimore & Koshy, 2010). It would be more accurate 
therefore to define this aspect of the policy as ‘proportional fairness’. 
Under the Government’s stable shares approach to equity policy, each strategic 
group within the sector exceeded its target in 2012 (See Table 1). The Go8’s 
performance was the least impressive of all groups, exceeding its target by less than one 
per cent. Two of its members (The Australian National University and the University of 
Sydney) actually saw a decline in low-SES participation between 2008 and 2012. 
Despite the reality of the Government’s calibrated approach to widening participation, 
the Go8 publicly represented it as a damaging, one-size-fits-all policy. In its submission 
to the 2013 Review of the Demand Driven Funding System (the foundation upon which 
the equity policy was based) the Go8 stated: 
Policy development around the uncapped funding initiative to date has reflected a 
preoccupation with matters of national consistency, including orientations to 
sameness of supply… uncapped funding in the current policy framework has been 
expanding the base of the system but at the expense of its apex, just when global 
competition among leading universities is intensifying (Go8, 2013a, p. 1). 
 
This approach was part a sustained attack by the Go8 against the current policy of 
access and participation, which in its view was restricting the availability of funds for 
research in preference to ‘enrolling [low-achieving school leavers] directly into 
Bachelor degree programs’ (Go8, 2012). Whilst affirming its support for higher 
education equity in the abstract, the Go8 called for replacing sector-wide targets with 
more meaningful mission-based compacts under which universities ‘could be funded to 
do different things, and to do them well’ (Go8, 2013b). That the compacts were actually 
designed this way was an inconvenient truth overlooked by the elite universities. 
 Whilst the uncapping supply of undergraduate places was the most 
publicised feature of the Government’s equity policy, it was not its only significant 
element. The Higher Education Participation and Partnerships Program (HEPPP) was 
designed to assist universities in recruiting and retaining students from low SES 
backgrounds.  It comprised two components. The first (Participation) provided 
additional funding on a pro-rata basis (approximately $1250) for each low-SES student 
enrolled. The Participation component generally aligns with Marginson’s 
conceptualisation of a fairness approach to equity. The second component 
(Partnerships) was closer to an inclusive approach to equity as it encouraged 
universities to develop activities in partnership with schools and other stakeholders to 
raise the aspirations and build the capacity of people from low SES backgrounds to 
participate in higher education. The amount of funding allocated is shown in Table 2. 
Over two competitive funding rounds, 27 projects totalling more than $183 million were 
funded. Each of the sector’s groups was well represented; notably the Go8 had 
representation in nine projects, including six of the eleven funded in the first round. 
 The high representation of Go8 universities is an important distinction, as 
Partnership funding represents an equity policy approach preferring inclusion over 
fairness. All projects selected for funding supported activities designed to build the 
cultural capital of disadvantaged students well in advance of them entering higher 
education.  Capital was built in a number of ways. For example, aspirational outreach 
programs worked to encourage students to view higher education as a meaningful career 
or life choice. Other universities worked in secondary schools to develop academic 
communication and writing skills in the students. And pathway programs sought to 
recognise non-traditional academic qualifications to meet merit-based selection 
processes. The focus of most of these programs was to build aspirations and skills 
towards higher education in general, rather than elite universities in particular. This 
‘inclusive’ approach to higher education equity keeps disadvantaged students at arms-
length from elite universities in two respects. First, they incline disadvantaged students 
to contribute to an increasing population of ‘like’ students in low-status institutions than 
struggle as ‘strangers in paradise’ (Reay, Crozier, & Clayton, 2009). Second, relatedly, 
if they do aspire to be selected into an elite institution then the student must first 
transform him/herself: whilst the university cannot change the student’s latent cultural 
class they can support the parents in acquiring compensatory cultural capital at the 
family level (Dumais & Ward, 2010). Policies of inclusion represent a win-win for the 
elite university: the relatively few disadvantaged students who are accepted are, by the 
end, converted into high-status ones, whilst the remaining majority are  diverted to low-
status institutions. 
Fairness, inclusion and an alternative approach to equity in higher education 
A critical analysis of the contemporary Australian higher education equity landscape 
reveals a blurred, rather than binary, distinction between the ‘fair’ and ‘inclusive’ 
approaches. Australia’s elite universities’ negative reaction to a perceived policy of 
‘preoccupation with matters of national consistency, including orientations to sameness 
of supply’ (Go8, 2013a, p. 1) ignored its inherent flexibility in setting differential 
institutional targets and significant support for outreach activities to modify student 
supply chains. The policy’s keystone – the 20 per cent participation target – sought only 
to achieve the target in the aggregate. Individual institutional targets compensated for 
historical enrolment trends and in doing so, implicitly recognised status legacies. In this 
regard, the policy represented a ‘proportional fairness’ approach to equity in higher 
education. Importantly, the 20 per cent target was only one element. Significant funds 
were and continue to be provided to facilitate an inclusive approach to equity, through 
outreach, alternative pathways and skills-building. Using the financial data from Table 
2, it could be said that the Australian Government adopted an approach to higher 
education equity that was two-third proportionally fair and one-third inclusive.  
 Second, there is little evidence that inclusive policies facilitate equity in 
higher education more effectively. For example, in the five years prior to the Australian 
Government adopting the 20 per cent target, sector-wide low-SES enrolments rose only 
marginally, from 14.68 to 15.25 per cent. In the Go8, proportional enrolments actually 
dropped, from 9.03 per cent to 8.97 per cent (Department of Education, 2012b). The 
concern for elite institutions is not that policies of fairness will fail, but that they might 
succeed. Faced with the possibility that contemporary higher education policy might 
actually be ‘unlocking the gates to the peasants’, Australia’s elite universities continue 
to prosecute their case with a certain Janus-faced logic. On the one hand, they argue the 
current policy was never meant to be one of equity but of national productivity; seeking 
to raise higher education participation overall rather than specific groups of 
disadvantaged students. Yet in the same policy document (Go8, 2014) they argue that 
the 20 per cent target cannot be achieved, thereby drawing attention to the fact that the 
policy largely concerns equity. Elsewhere they argue the cost of financing students 
towards national productivity is too great, as is the cost of not financing research 
towards the same end (Go8, 2013c). For some elite universities, equity is an issue for 
teaching and learning; however if they could avoid subsidising teaching out of research 
funds they ‘would  be in a much better position to provide students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds with financial and other forms of support’ (University of Sydney, 2013, p. 
1). And whilst a student’s prior academic achievement ‘is not a definitive measure of 
academic ability’ it is ‘a measure of academic preparedness’ (University of Queensland, 
2013, p. 3). Yet academic performance is as much, if not more, a function of social 
status as innate intellectual ability (James, 2001). 
 This is why, despite the mislabelling of Australian higher education policy 
as ‘fair’, Simon Marginson is right in the broader and more important sense. The 
Orwellian contention that some people are more equal than others remains relevant in 
contemporary Australian higher education as it does in other higher education systems 
throughout the world. The data show that those disadvantaged students who do benefit 
from equity practices continue to be enrolled in disproportionate numbers in low-status 
universities. This is the reason why some degree of freedom through control remains 
necessary. If higher education policy continues to ignore the reality of status in the field 
of higher education, then attempts to make it more inclusive can only ever succeed in 
the aggregate sense. Acknowledging the function of status in higher education is the 
first step to recognising, publicly, that students are selected using both merit and 
normative criteria. Universities admission practices do not solely function to select the 
most worthy students but also the right students; where ‘right’ is determined by 
comparing the habitus that formed the student with the habitus of the institution. When 
the external policy environment threatens to disrupt this matching process, institutional 
practices react accordingly: this is the ‘iron rule’ of student selection (Karabel, 2005). 
Acknowledging this is a necessary step in developing higher education equity policy 
that will increase access for disadvantaged groups in all strata of higher education.    
 A further benefit of identifying and differentiating between notions of 
fairness and inclusion at the abstract level is to help explicate the critical distinction 
between disadvantage and status. The two are linked, but not identical. Government 
higher education equity policy seeks to increase representation of disadvantaged 
students and in this respect all universities – including the elite – are in strong support. 
What they resist is increasing the representation of low-status students, which are 
disproportionately represented in this milieu. Conflating the two hinders the 
advancement of equity, as it confuses social class with status. This in turn leads to 
ideological debates surrounding the issue of class, which are a significant barrier to 
bipartisan political action in Australia (see for example Donnelly, 2013; Seccombe, 
2012; Swan, 2014). In Australia, disadvantage is expressed in terms of socio-economic 
background, which in turn is defined by geographical location; specifically postcode. 
However, in Australia as elsewhere there is a positive correlation between parental 
income, educational background and their children’s pre-tertiary academic performance 
(Centre for the Study of Higher Education, 2008). Since within each geographical 
location defined as being ‘disadvantaged’ there exist a number of students who are not 
disadvantaged, and these students perform better academically, on average than their 
peers, it is probable that advantaged students make up a disproportionate number of 
higher education enrolments from notionally disadvantaged areas (Centre for the Study 
of Higher Education, 2008).    
It is therefore possible for an elite university to select high-status (i.e. 
academically achieving) students that give the appearance (statistically at least) of being 
disadvantaged. Elite universities do not oppose a fairness approach that seeks to 
ameliorate disadvantage; they oppose a fairness approach that ameliorates their 
positional advantage conferred by status. Elite universities can and do address the 
former whilst still resisting the latter. These include ‘miraculous exceptions’ (Bourdieu, 
1996) who overcome an initial lack of cultural capital either by purchasing it later (e.g. 
hiring tutors, enrolling in an elite secondary school) or by exceptional effort (Liu, 
2011).  
 Simply providing an external funding incentive to enrol disadvantaged 
students has never worked to any large degree. Certainly the (approximate) $1250 
funding incentive did not encourage Australia’s elite universities to significantly alter 
their selection processes. Put simply, a high-status student with accumulated cultural 
capital makes them still more valuable to an elite university, than a low-status student 
with subsidised economic capital. Directly increasing the funding is unlikely to be 
effective, since national budget constraints make a significant increase improbable, 
especially for a nation that contributes one of the lowest proportions of its GDP towards 
higher education (OECD, 2013). Whether the policy context is fair or inclusive or both 
makes little difference. Elite universities do not resist equity policies of fairness and 
embrace those of inclusion. They resist both, to varying degrees. Cultural capital is the 
primary resource that serves universities in their position-taking strategies (Bourdieu, 
1993). It can and is acquired by fiscal means: as Bourdieu reminds us ‘economic capital 
is at the root of all other types of capital’ (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 288). However the 
influence of economic capital is diluted, in an in inflationary sense, when it is injected 
from outside the field since all actors benefit in more or less equal proportions and their 
positions within the field remain essentially unaltered.  
 However economic capital can also be redistributed within the field. An 
alternative approach to equity policy therefore is rather than adopting a ‘rising tide lifts 
all boats’ philosophy to funding equity in higher education, reconsider the allocation of 
funding as a tool of position-taking within the sector. The analogy of a trading system, 
such as an emissions trading scheme is illustrative, though not entirely accurate as shall 
be explained.  An equity participation target could be set for each institution; however 
they would have the option of either achieving this target themselves or ‘purchasing’ - 
in a virtual sense and on an interim basis only - the required number of targeted students 
from another institution with excess capacity. Most of this money would flow, in real 
terms, to the university ‘selling’ the student, which could use it to further improve the 
recruitment, selection and pastoral support of more students. The remainder of the 
money would be required to be invested in inclusive policies at the institutional level 
(e.g. outreach, scholarship, etc) designed to increase actual enrolments at the elite 
institution itself – not at the aggregate, sector level. Targets could be determined via the 
stable shares approach or via a weighting, requiring more effort from universities with 
lower commencing levels (Phillimore & Koshy, 2010). In either case the price could be 
progressively increased until it reached a level high enough to preclude the virtual 
trading of students from low to high status universities. This is necessary since a 
primary function of virtual enrolments should be to alter the behaviour of the elite 
institutions, rather than being an end in itself. 
 This is an alternative deployment of fairness through equity. The proportion 
of higher education students of lower status is increased initially at the aggregate (i.e. 
sector) level and eventually the individual (i.e. university) level. During the transition 
phase, any university choosing the virtual option must pay a cost; one which 
simultaneously protects its cultural capital yet can be mobilised towards the creation of 
future academic capital. Where this differs from a more usual trading scheme is that the 
price should not be set by the market; that is, the field of higher education. As a 
society’s broader demographics change and the patterns of marginalisation and inequity 
alter, so too should the target group and their cultural capital value. This is a decision 
for a democratic government to make, not an oligarchic higher education market. Such 
an approach requires elite institutions to do their relative part in making higher 
education more equitable, rather than their traditional response, which is to support 
advancements at aggregate levels and at the expense of lower-status institutions, they 
should be required to compensate them. A trading system approach would allow elite 
universities to maintain their status and preference for inclusive approaches to higher 
education. At the same time it would force them to make real change within a given 
timeframe. 
Concluding comments  
Status in higher education exists and it matters. Furthermore, status has a significant 
effect on institutional response to equity policy and when policy is blind to this, its 
effectiveness is compromised. The distinction between policies of fairness and policies 
of inclusion is an important one, as it helps identify how universities, particularly elite 
ones, resist policies predicating fairness. To the extent policies of inclusion are 
preferred by high status institutions, it is because they protect the cultural capital within 
the field of higher education, improve the position of the elite and increase the potential 
of the field to dominate others in society by allowing it to project its doxa more widely. 
 The issue of status can and should be more clearly referenced in higher 
education equity policy. One way of doing this is to apply a mechanism of cultural 
capital exchange within the field of higher education, as described above. It might be 
argued that the field might view this exchange as being ‘illegitimate’ (Bourdieu, 2002, 
p. 282). However they will not be able to exclude it, so long as they remain, to a degree, 
a public good. The public purpose of a university is determined normatively, across the 
wider social space and is given shape and form through public policy. If the public wish 
public universities to be more accessible then these institutions must accede, or decamp 
into the private sphere.  
 Public universities may no longer be public goods to a large degree but they 
still should provide public good. In order to achieve a more democratic distribution of 
its benefits, higher education policy needs a greater focus on each institution itself, 
rather than treating the sector as a homogenous entity, which it is not. Inclusive higher 
education policy does have the potential to play the dominant role in democratising 
higher education but only when operating under a broader rubric of fairness, employing 
freedom through control.  
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Table 1. Low-SES enrolments in Australian public universities 2008-2012 
  Actual performance1 Target2 
Group University   2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012 
Go8   9.91% 9.84% 10.05% 10.55% 10.55% 9.83% 
  The Australian National University 4.36% 4.14% 4.40% 4.35% 4.24% 5.61% 
  The University of Sydney 7.65% 7.39% 7.33% 7.22% 7.50% 9.12% 
  University of New South Wales 8.59% 7.94% 8.52% 10.15% 8.92% 9.41% 
  The University of Queensland 14.98% 14.83% 15.09% 15.34% 15.05% 10.95% 
  The University of Adelaide 14.11% 14.36% 14.66% 15.55% 16.07% 13.03% 
  Monash University 12.34% 12.37% 12.23% 12.38% 12.68% 11.66% 
  The University of Melbourne 7.34% 7.52% 7.70% 8.47% 9.08% 9.12% 
  The University of Western Australia 5.99% 6.17% 6.20% 6.24% 6.31% 6.34% 
ATN   14.71% 14.82% 15.31% 15.37% 15.99% 1.27% 
IRU   19.37% 19.44% 19.65% 20.11% 20.51% 1.15% 
RUN   29.03% 29.25% 29.56% 29.83% 30.00% 0.98% 
TOTAL   16.26% 16.34% 16.66% 17.02% 17.30% 1.05% 
 
Table 2: HEPPP funding 2013-2017 
 
 Funding ($,000) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Participation $111,696 $118,601 $127,500 $136,817 $147,812 
Partnerships $80,358 $62,118 $64,680 $48,310 $48,463 






                                                 
Notes 
1 Compiled from Selected Higher Education Statistics (Equity appendices) at 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/highereducation/HigherEducationStatistics/StatisticsP
ublications/Pages/Students.aspx   
2 Compiled from University Mission-Based Compacts at 
http://www.innovation.gov.au/research/missionbasedcompacts/Pages/default.aspx 
